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I.

INTRODUCTION

A "coronavirus" (CoV) is a part of a significant family of viruses, which
can lead to disease and respiratory infections over a wide range of severity in
humans, from the common cold to more serious diseases, such as Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV or MERS) and Severe Acute
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Respiratory Syndrome (SARS-CoV or SARS virus).' What began as a new
coronavirus and unknown disease when the December 2019 outbreak began
in Wuhan, China, has since become the global COVID-19 pandemic.2
On January 9, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced,
"Chinese authorities have made a preliminary determination of a novel (or
new) coronavirus, identified in a hospitalized person with pneumonia in
Wuhan." 3 When this novel coronavirus made its initial appearance in Wuhan
in late 2019, it appeared to be closely related to SARS. 4 However, China
subsequently stated that testing ruled out SARS, MERS, the flu, and "other
common respiratory pathogens." 5 This highly contagious and novel
coronavirus was eventually named Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), which causes an illness now known as
COVID-19.6 By early 2020, COVID-19 had spread through China and began
reaching the United States and Europe through infected travelers.7
On March 12, 2020, the WHO announced that COVID-19 was a
pandemic.' On March 6, 2020, the President of the United States, Donald
Trump, signed the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental
Appropriations Act 2020 (Public Law 116-123), and on March 27, 2020,
President Trump signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act (Public Law 116-127).9 As of October 17, 2020, the WHO
had reported 39,196,259 confirmed cases of COVID-19, resulting in
1,101,298 deaths.' 0

1.
Q&A on Coronaviruses (COVID-19), WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.who.intlemergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/question-and-answers-hub/q-adetail/q-a-coronaviruses; Statement RegardingCluster of Pneumonia Cases in Wuhan, China, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (Jan. 9,2020), https://www.who.int/china/news/detail/09-01-2020-who-statementregarding-cluster-of-pneumonia-cases-in-wuhan-china [hereinafter WHO Statement].
2.
Kara
Rogers
et
al.,
Coronavirus,
ENCYC.
https://www.britannica.com/science/coronavirus-virus-group (last visited July 5, 2020).
3.

WHO Statement, supra note 1.

4.

Rogers et al., supra note 2.

5.

WHO Statement, supra note

6.

Rogers et al., supra note 2.

7.

Id

BRITANNiCA,

1.

8.

WHO Announces COVID-19 Outbreaka Pandemic, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (Dec.
3,
2020),
https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid19/news/news/ 2020/3/who-announces-covid-19-outbreak-a-pandemic.
&

CDC COVID-19 Global Response: Fact Sheet, CTRs. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
(June 12, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/global-covid19/fact-sheet-cdc-covid-19-global-response.pdf.
9.

PREVENTION

10.. WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard,WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (Oct.
17, 2020, 1:43 PM), https://covid19.who.int/.
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COVID-19 is primarily contracted from person-to-person contact
through "small droplets from the nose or mouth, which are expelled when a
person with COVID-19 coughs, sneezes, or speaks."" A person is at high
risk of becoming infected with COVID-19 if he or she is in close contact with
someone else who is infected with COVID-19, and both individuals can
subsequently transmit the disease to others." Monitoring persons who come
into close contact with another person who is infected with COVID-19 helps
such exposed persons obtain care and treatment in a timely manner, and
reduce the potential of further transmission to others.' 3 Such a monitoring
process is called "contact tracing." 4
The modern methods of contact tracing are the result of tools developed
by public health officials since the mid-1800s to study and prevent
epidemics.' 5 Contact tracing is a "core disease control activity" used by
government health departments to stop, or at least slow, the spread of
infectious diseases.1 6 Contact tracing for COVID-19 typically involves the
following components:"
1. Identification: Once it is confirmed that a person is infected with
COVID-19 (a "Case"), identification of his or her contacts occurs by asking
about the infected person's activities, and of the persons around them, from
the time the infected person first became ill (such as family members, friends,
co-workers, and health care professionals)." The Case is usually directed to
self-isolate.19
2.
List: All persons who have had contact with the infected person
should be listed as "contacts." 2 0 Attempts should be made to notify such

11.

Q&A on Coronaviruses(COVID-19), supra note 1.

Contact Tracing: Q&A, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (May 9, 2017), https://www.
12.
who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/contact-tracing.
13.

Id

14.

Id

15.
Kara Rogers, Questions About COVID-19 Answered, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (June 18, 2020),
https://www.britannica-com/story/questions-about-covid- 19-answered.
Contact Tracing - CDC's Role and Approach, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
(Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/php/contacttracing-CDC-role-and-approach.pdf.
&

16.

PREVENTION

Contact Tracing: Q&A, supra note 12; Coronavirus Disease2019 (COVID-19): Contact
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov
/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/contact-tracing.html (last visited July 5, 2020) [hereinafter
CoronavirusDisease 2019].
17.

Tracing, CTRS.

18.

Contact Tracing: Q&A, supranote 12; CoronavirusDisease 2019, supra note 17.

19.

CoronavirusDisease 2019, supra note 17.

20.

Contact Tracing: Q&A, supranote 12.
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contacts of their contact status, explaining what that status means, providing
appropriate referrals to receive testing, explaining why it is important to seek
immediate care if symptoms develop, providing information regarding
transmission prevention, and informing the contacts of any further steps that
are to take place.21 Typically, contacts of COVID-19 Cases are directed to
self-quarantine at home for fourteen days after their last exposure to the Case,
maintain six feet of "social distancing" from other persons during the
"quarantine period," and self-monitor for symptoms, such as checking their
temperatures twice a day.22
Contacts should receive regular follow-ups for
3. Follow-up:
23
monitoring of symptoms and other signs of infection.
Normally, these basic steps of contact tracing are performed by
conducting interviews and surveys of the infected persons, which can be
labor-intensive, time-consuming, and expensive. 2 4
As noted by Christine S. Wilson, Commissioner of the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission, "as governments grapple with how to stem the tide of
infection and death" in the age of COVID-19, "many governments are
turning to technology for assistance." 2 Digital smartphone-based contact
tracing tools can trace and notify contacts faster and with less coordination,
providing greater "speed and efficacy while also reducing cost and
interpersonal contact." 2 6 But the contact tracing applications are so new that
not much is known yet regarding the data types that will be gathered, who
will have access to the data, whether any of the data will be shared, and if so,
to whom and how long it will be retained. 27
The purpose for choosing this topic is to explore privacy issues being
faced in distinct parts of the world by countries exploring the use of digital
contact tracing phone applications to help gain control over the COVID-19
global pandemic. First, this article will provide a brief history of the United
States, the European Union, and Israel, and explore the applicable privacy
laws governing its corresponding citizens in relation to the usage of digital
contact tracing applications. Then, this article will compare the similarities
21.

Id.; CoronavirusDisease 2019, supra note 17.

22.

CoronavirusDisease 2019, supra note 17.

23.

Contact Tracing: Q&A, supra note 12.

24.

Rogers, supra note 15.

Christine S. Wilson, Comm'r, FED. TRADE COMM'N, Remarks at Privacy + Security
25.
Academy Virtual Event: Privacy and Public/Private Partnerships in a Pandemic 3 (May 7, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1574938/wilson_-_remarksatprivacy_
securityacademy_5-7-20.pdf.
26.

Rogers, supranote 15.

27.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 5.
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and differences between such laws, and how the United States, the European
Union, and Israel are addressing such laws relative to digital contact tracing
application usage. Finally, this article will conclude with an assessment on
the current contact tracing situation in the United States and what can be
learned by looking towards the European Union and Israel.
APPLICABLE PRIVACY LAWS FOR DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING
APPLICATIONS

H.

A.

The UnitedStates

Collectively, the United States is a federal republic of fifty states. 28 The
U.S. Constitution outlines a federal system of government wherein the
federal government is appointed specific powers and the rest is preserved for
the states. 29 Under the U.S. Constitution, the federal government is divided
into three separate branches of government: legislative powers are vested in
Congress, consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate;
executive powers are vested in the President, and judicial powers are vested
in the Supreme Court.30 The government in each of the fifty states is
structured similarly to that of the federal government, with a state
constitution, a state legislature, a governor, and a state judiciary. 31 At the
time of finalizing this article, the United States, with a population of
330,457,878, 32 has incurred 8,081,489 COVID-19 Cases, resulting in
218,511 deaths. 33
The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) was enacted for the following reasons:
[T]o improve portability
coverage in the group and
fraud, and abuse in health
promote the use of medical
long-term care services

and continuity of health insurance
individual markets, to combat waste,
insurance and health care delivery, to
savings accounts, to improve access to
and coverage, to simplify the

28.
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, United States: Introduction & Quick Facts,
ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States (last visited Sept. 22, 2020).
29.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

30.

U.S. CONST. art. l; id art.

31.

Wilfred Owen, et al., United States: State and Local Government, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,

II;

id art. Ill.

https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States/State-and-local-government (last visited Sept. 22, 2020).
32.
US. and World Population Clock, U.S.
https://www.census.gov/popclock.

CENSUS

BUREAU

(Oct.

17,

2020),

CoronavirusDisease 2019 (COVID-19): CDC COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
33.
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 18, 2020, 12:21 PM), https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#cases casesper100klast7days [hereinafter Cases in the U.S.].
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34
administration of health insurance, and for other purposes.

Under HIPAA, personal health information is that which is created or
received by certain types of entities, such as health care providers, employers,
and public health authorities (covered entities), related to the physical and
mental health of an individual," and specifically identifies the person
(individually identifiable health information).36 Any U.S. agency or an
individual state or territory that has been delegated the responsibility for the
public health can be considered a "public health authority" under HIPAA
regulation Section 164.501 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), and
such public health authority may use or disclose protected health information
without the authorization of the corresponding individual if required by law
or for the purpose of protecting the public health against disease.3 7
If a person receives a positive test result for COVID-19, that information
can legally be shared with public health authorities without such person's
consent.3 8 During the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued public bulletins
addressing HIPAA privacy rules in relation to covered entities' release of
personal health information of individuals who have tested positive for
COVID-193 9 One such bulletin, referencing Section 164.512(a) of the CFR,
clarifies that the HIPAA privacy rules allow for a covered entity to disclose
protected health information of an individual who tested positive for COVID19 pursuant to state law that requires reporting of such data.40 Another such
bulletin clarifies further that the HIPAA privacy rule allows for what would
typically be considered "protected" health information to be disclosed to
assist in nationwide public health emergencies, and that the Secretary of HHS
has waived sanctions and penalties for such disclosures without the patient's

34.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).

§

1320d(4).

35.

42 U.S.C.

36.

See id.

37.

45 C.F.R.

38.

Wilson, supranote 25, at 12.

§

1320d(6).

§§ 164.501-.512

(2020).

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., COVID-19 AND HIPAA: DISCLOSURES TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT, PARAMEDICS, OTHER FIRST RESPONDERS AND PUBLIC HEALTH AUTHORITIES (2020)
39.

[hereinafter
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-hipaa-and-first-responders-508.pdf
DISCLOSURES]; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., COVID-19 & HIPAA BULLETIN: LIMITED
WAIVER OF HIPAA SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES DURING A NATIONWIDE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
(2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hipaa-and-covid-19-limited-hipaa-waiver-bulletin508.pdf [hereinafter LIMITED WAIVER].

40.

DISCLOSURES, supra note 39, at 1.
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consent.4 1 Such waivers became effective as of March 15, 2020 and shall
only apply during the President's declaration of a public health emergency. 2
There are gaps in the protections afforded to individuals under HIPAA
due to ongoing developments in technology, as information such as one's
heart health-typically viewed as individually identifiable health
information-is now ordinarily stored on smart phones and smart watches. 43
Commercial technology companies that have access to such private health
information are not subject to HIPAA, but are generally under the oversight
of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).44 The FTC is the "primary federal
data security regulator" in the United States.4 5 The FTC's authority as a data
security regulator is derived from Section 5 of the FTC Act, which gives the
FTC broad authority over protecting consumers from "unfair or deceptive
trade practices in or affecting commerce." 46 Consumers who initially
consented to a technology company's privacy policy, relative to the
collection of their health and personal data on their smart phones, did not
consider the possibility of how such data could be used and shared during a
pandemic. 47 According to FTC Commissioner Wilson, "the assumption that
consumers have given informed consent to the collection of their dataparticularly for the purpose of monitoring their compliance with social
isolation measures during a pandemic-is flawed." 8 If U.S. citizens simply
accept that their personal information is not private, their "reasonable
expectation of privacy" under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution is
gutted. 49
The Fourth Amendment protects U.S. citizens against unlawful searches
and seizures by the government. 50 The Framers of the U.S. Constitution
experienced unreasonable searches and seizures in England under general
warrants granted by agents of the King. 51 The Fourth Amendment was born
41.

LIMITED WAIVER, supra note 39, at 1-2.

42.

Id. at 1.

43.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 13-14.

New HHS Rules Ease Access to Digital Patient Health Data, ASH CLINICAL NEWS (Mar.
44.
13, 2020), https://www.ashclinicalnews.org/online-exclusives/new-hhs-rules-ease-access-digital-patinthealth-data/.
45.

PRACTICAL LAW DATA PRIVACY ADVISOR, F.T.C. DATA SECURITY STANDARDS AND

ENFORCEMENT, 1-2 (2020), Westlaw.

46.

Id.

47.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 12-13.

48.

Id at 13.

49.

Id at 16.

50.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

51.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); see also Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
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out of the Framers' intent to protect Americans from unnecessary and unjust
government attacks on their privacy.52 If a contact tracing app would, for
example, lead law enforcement to identify violators of quarantine orders
through "data collection, rather than direct observation," that could implicate
the Fourth Amendment.53 As Chief Justice John Roberts noted in United
States v. Carpenter, "when the Government tracks the location of a cell
phone it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle
monitor to the phone's user." 54 In Carpenter, wherein the Court ruled the
government's acquisition of the defendant's cell-site records constituted a
warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice
Roberts referenced a comment made by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v.
United States, that it is the Supreme Court's duty to ensure as science
continues to develop, such progress does not chip away at the Fourth
Amendment's protections.55
As FTC Commissioner Wilson has noted, "[t]here has long been a call
for federal privacy legislation.""6 In 2012, the FTC provided a significant
report on privacy to Congress in which the FTC recommended that Congress
enact federal privacy legislation that is comprehensive.57 In the absence of
comprehensive federal privacy legislation which, to date, Congress has not
successfully passed, the FTC has provided consumer privacy and data
security guidance documents for commercial businesses and consumers.58 In
addition, the National Institute for Standards and Technology, the
International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), and the App
Association have provided recommendations, resources, and guidelines for
best practices; the FTC has utilized its general authority to protect
consumers' privacy, but such authority has considerable limits. 59
Numerous U.S. senators'have stated their concerns that contact tracing
applications' access to personal health information could provide the ability
for technology companies to build consumer health profiles that could
ultimately subject such consumers to discrimination from insurance
companies, employers, and others. 60 The following bills have been
introduced in the U.S. Senate:

52.

See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 8; see also Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390-91.

53.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 16.

54.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 U.S. 2206, 2218 (2018).

55.

Id. at 2223.

56.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 18.

57.

Id. at 18.

58.

Id. at

59.

Id. at 21-22.

60.

Id. at 14.

18-21.
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1. Senate Bill 3663, COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of
2020, introduced May 7, 2020, and described as follows:
This bill generally prohibits covered entities from collecting,
processing, or transferring an individual's personally identifiable
information for the purpose of contact tracing with respect to
COVID-19 (i.e., coronavirus disease 2019) without first obtaining
the individual's affirmative consent to use such information.
Applicable personally identifiable information includes, but is not
limited to, precise geolocation data, long-lasting digital identifiers
of individuals, and personal health information. However, such
information does not include data that is de-identified, related to
employee health screening for on-site entry, or publicly available.
Covered entities, which include businesses, common carriers, and
certain nonprofit organizations, also must provide a mechanism
for individuals to revoke prior affirmative consent. 61

2.
Senate Bill 3749, Public Health Emergency Privacy Act,
introduced May 14, 2020, is described as "[a] bill to protect the privacy of
health information during a national health emergency."62
3.
Senate Bill 3861-described as "a bill to establish privacy
requirements for operators of infectious disease exposure notification
services"-was introduced to the Senate on June 1, 2020 and subsequently
referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 63
FTC Commissioner Wilson-while specifically noting Senate Bill
3663, COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020 is "a welcome
development"-continues to assert that comprehensive privacy legislation
governing responsible uses of personal health data with transparency is
preferable to specific legislation that would only address COVID-19 contact
tracing application privacy issues.6 4 At the time of finalizing this article, all
three Senate bills listed above are still under committee review. 65
B.

The European Union

The European Union (EU) is an international organization of twentyseven European countries with social, economic, and security policies that
61.

COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020).

62.

Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3749, 116th Cong. (2020).

63.

Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong. (2020).

64.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 19; S. 3663.

65.

S. 3663; S. 3749; S. 3861.
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commonly govern ." The EU was created by the Maastricht Treaty, which
was made effective as of November 1, 1993, and is the document under
which countries, referred to as "Member States," joined to form the EU. 67
The intention behind the treaty was to improve the incorporation of European
politics and economics by, among other things, creating common rights of its
member states' citizens. 68 The Maastricht Treaty was subsequently amended
by the Lisbon Treaty, ratified on December 1, 2009.69 Although not a
"constitution" for the EU, the Lisbon Treaty created a position of EU
president of greater permanence, enhanced the European Parliament's power,
and incorporated a Charter of Fundamental Rights addressing civil and social
rights for the EU citizens. 70 The current Member States of the EU are
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. 7 ' The United Kingdom (U.K.),
which had been a founding member of the EU, left the EU in 2020; however,
despite a successful "Brexit," the U.K. remains in the EU through the end of
2020.72 The population of the EU is 446 million. 73 For the EU, the European
Economic Area (EEA) (consisting of Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway)
and the U.K., collectively, have a total number of 4,799,988 COVID-19
74
Cases resulting in 200,587 deaths.

66.

Matthew J. Gabel, European Union, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannicacom/

topic/European-Union (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
67.
Gabel, supra note 66; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 1, June
7, 2016, O.J. (C 202) 13.
68.

Gabel, supra note 66.

69.
Michael Ray, Lisbon Treaty, ENCYC. BRITANMCA, https://www.britannica.com/event
/Lisbon-Treaty (last visited Sept. 23, 2020).
70.

Id

71.

Gabel, supra note 66.

72.
Gabel, supra note 66; see Alasdair Sandford, Post-Brexit Guide: Where are we now - and
how did we get there?, EURo NEWS, https://www.euronews.com/2020/06/1 /brexit-drat-deal-first-ofmany-hurdles-to-a-smooth-exit (last updated Oct. 23, 2020).
73.
Living in the EU, EUR. UNION, https://europaeu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_
en#:-:text=such%20as%20education.,Size%20and%20population,population%20after/a20China%20an
d%20lndia (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).

74.
Countries in the EU and EEA, GOV'T U.K., https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea (last visited Sept
23, 2020); COVID-19 situation update for the EU/EEA and the UK, as of 24 October 2020, EUR. CTR.
FOR DISEASE PREVENTION & CONTROL, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/cases-2019-ncov-eueea (last
updated Oct. 24, 2020).
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The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) established data
privacy laws governing all of the European Union's member states. 75 The
GDPR created protections over the processing of personal data collected
from citizens in the EU-regardless of whether the business performing the
personal data collection is located within the EU and/or processes the
collection within the EU. 76 Under the GDPR, "personal data" is defined as
follows:
Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person ('data subject'); an identifiable natural person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity of that natural person.7 7

Under the GDPR, personal data is to be collected for "specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes," the scope of which is to be limited to the extent
necessary for such purposes.78 A business collecting personal data of an EU
consumer must also have technology or other measures in place to safeguard
the protection of such data against unauthorized access and accidental loss. 79
The consumer must give his or her consent before such data may be
processed for lawful reasons, such as "for the performance of a task carried
out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority." 80 The
processing of personal health data without the subject's explicit, specific
consent is prohibited under the GDPR, with some exceptions-one notable
exception being for public health reasons. 81 To that end, there are potentially
permissible bases under Articles 6 and 9 of the GDPR to process personal
health data for COVID-19 contact tracing.82 Under Article 6, the personal
health data-garnered from contact tracing could potentially be processed by
75.. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 32 [hereinafter Protection of Natural
Persons].
76.

Id art. 3.

77.

Id art. 4(1).

78.

Id. art. 5.

79.

Id

80.

Protection of Natural Persons, supranote 75, art. 6.

81.
Id art. 9; see also Lothar Determann, Healthy Data Protection, 26 MICH. TECH. L. REV.
229,240 (2020).

82.

Olivia Whitcroft, A Guide to DataProcessingDuringa Pandemic, 20 PRIVACY AND DATA

PROT. 7, 8 (2020).
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public health authorities as a "task carried out in the public interest" in
consideration of COVID-19's impact on the public's health as long as it had
a lawful basis.8 3 Another potential basis under Article 6 would be in the vital
interests of a citizen's life, for which collection of personal health data related
to COVID-19 contact tracing could be applied.84 As to Article 9 of the
GDPR, Article 9(2)(i) could provide a basis for personal health data
processing as a result of COVID-19 contact tracing if, similar to provisions
in Article 6, it had a legal basis and was necessary for public health
interests. 85 Also, similar to Article 6, Article 9( 2 )(c) could also provide a
basis for processing personal health data resulting from contact tracing if
necessary to safeguard a citizen's vital interests due to COVID-19. 86
The EU's eHealth Network, a voluntary health network among the
Member States established under Article 14 of Directive 2011/24/EU, 87
developed and released a "Toolbox" of contact tracing application guidelines
for EU Member States with the support of the European Commission. 88 The
critical requirements for contact tracing applications, as stated in the EU
Toolbox, are that personal data is collected in the application on a voluntary
basis, that the application is approved by the corresponding Member State's
health authority, that it protects the personal data through secure encryption,
and the data is destroyed once no longer needed. 89 As Member States chose
contact tracing applications individually rather than agreeing to one universal
application for the EU's use, the eHealth Network subsequently released
additional guidelines to support interoperability of contact tracing
applications that would exchange data across the Member States while still
safeguarding personal data.9 0
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Israel

Israel is a small Jewish country in the Middle East.91 Israel's statehood
was declared on May 14, 1948.92 Israel is a democratic republic and has a
parliamentary system of government. 93 Israel's legislative body is called the
Knesset.9 4 The Knesset is a single-chamber legislature with 120 members
who are typically elected every four years.9 5 Both Hebrew-the country's
official language-and Arabic are used in all Knesset proceedings.96
Israel's Prime Minister is the head of government and forms the
Cabinet, which is the government's main policy-making and executive
body. 97 Cabinet members are not required to be members of the Knesset.98
The president, who is the head of state, was traditionally elected by the
Knesset for a five-year term that could only be renewed once; however, as of
the year 2000, presidents are elected for one seven-year term. 99 The president
has no veto powers and the functions of the office are primarily ceremonial,
but the president does have the authority to appoint certain key officials,
magistrates, district judges, and justices of the Supreme Court. 100 The
population of Israel is 8,675,475.101 Israel has incurred 302,770 COVID-19
Cases resulting in 2,190 deaths. 0 2
Rather than having a formal written constitution, Israel's system of
government is based on a series of "Basic Laws," which are a political
compromise that serve as a pseudo-constitution. 03 These Basic Laws are
passed in the same way as other legislative acts; however, they are intended
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to serve as Israel's "guiding principles."104 In addition to its Basic Laws,
Israel's government is also based on legislative acts, executive orders, and
parliamentary practices.105 The Supreme Court of Israel's precedent is to rule
against laws that conflict with the Basic Laws.'0 6
The Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty was enacted in 1992 with
the purpose of protecting human dignity and liberty.1 07 Section 7(a) of the
Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty provides that all citizens have a
right to privacy. 10 8 Israel's Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that the
privacy rights protected in the Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty are
also deemed to be human rights.1 09
Under Section 7(a) of the Israel Security Agency Law of 2002 (ISA
Law), the Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) is to protect Israel against
terrorism and advance other essential national security interests of Israel." 0
When Israel began to incur positive COVID-19 Cases, the executive branch
of its government took quick action involving the Shin Bet, primarily relying
on the government's broad authority under "Basic Law: The Government"
to issue emergency regulations to protect Israel and secure the public's
safety."' Bypassing the legislative branch, as the Knesset was in flux at that
time without the ability to function, the executive branch's emergency
regulations gave the Shin Bet, which typically deals with terrorism threats,
the power to conduct contact tracing on Israeli citizens by obtaining
"cellphone location data" of citizens who were either positive COVID-19
Cases or suspected Cases without requiring a warrant or a citizen's
consent." 2 This COVID-19 surveillance was the subject of Ben Meir v.
Prime Minister, resulting in a novel decision of Israel's Supreme Court
during a novel pandemic." 3
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In Meir, Israel's Supreme Court found that the covert COVID-19
contact tracing conducted by the Shin Bet, using non-transparent technology
to surveil Israel's citizens and residents, was a severe violation of the right to
privacy."4 The Court noted the use of such emergency regulations may have
been appropriate during the initial weeks of Israel experiencing the pandemic
and the matter was one of urgency, but once Israel became in control over
the spread of COVID-19, emergency regulations were no longer sufficient."1 5
The Court considered whether statutory authority may already exist to allow
for such COVID-19 surveillance by reviewing Section 7(a) of the ISA Law
to determine if public health emergencies fell within its scope.116 The Court
found that the government could grant authority to the Shin Bet under Section
7(a) for matters that do not concern "national security" in its narrow meaning,
but such matters must be of a high level of danger to Israel's citizens
requiring immediate action through usage of the Shin Bet for a limited time
period, and for which no appropriate alternatives can be produced quickly
enough to thwart such an extreme threat of peril." 7 The Court determined
that the pandemic met the requirements of an immediate high level of danger
to Israel's citizens that legally justified the government's utilization of the
Shin Bet for contact tracing on a short-term basis. 18 However, the Court
held that the Shin Bet's surveillance could not be extended more than a few
more weeks on an emergency basis after its ruling, and that in order for it to
continue, formal legislation by the Knesset would be required.119
III.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW

The United States, EU, and Israel all have some semblance of a
"constitution" in place to protect certain rights of its citizens.120 The United
States and Israel are both lacking certain legislative safeguards to fully
protect their citizens' privacy related to COVID-19 digital contact tracing
approaches.' Administrative agencies of both the United States and the EU
have issued guidance to assist with privacy-related concerns. 22 However,
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there are more differences in existing law amongst the United States, EU,
and Israel than there are similarities.
The United States has no comprehensive laws in place to protect
personal data collected by commercial technology companies through
contact tracing mobile applications.'23 It is unclear at this time whether any
of the pending U.S. Senate bills will be passed during the current COVID-19
pandemic in the United States. As a result, any government decision to
utilize a contact tracing application, whether by an individual state or
nationwide, would not be governed by federal privacy laws that uniformly
and fully protect the public's personally identifiable and personal health
information gathered through the use of such an application. By contrast, the
EU does have laws governing the collection, usage, and retention of such
data.1 24 Yet, the U.K. Human Rights Committee Chair, Harriet Harman,
believes a law specifically tailored to govern COVID-19 contact tracing
applications is needed: "[c]urrently the protection is spread between the
GDPR, the Data Protection Act 2018, case law on privacy and the European
Convention on Human Rights, and it's a tangle of law which never envisaged
the sort of contact-tracing app that is now about to be brought in." 25
However, regardless of whether the GDPR is truly sufficient in its current
form to govern data privacy concerns in relation to contact tracing application
usage, the United States has no comprehensive federal legislation that is
comparable to the GDPR in the areas of privacy and data protection.1 26 The
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides privacy protection in
certain areas without specifically using the term "privacy."12 1 Personal
health data is governed by HIPAA to the extent that covered entities are
involved in the data collection and processing. 2 1 U.S. citizens have the right
to access their own personal health data under HIPAA, but unlike citizens in
the EU pursuant to the safeguards under the GDPR, "patients have no 'right
to be forgotten' or erasure. "129
The most significant difference amongst the United States, the EU, and
Israel is that, although all three have some semblance of privacy laws in place
to protect its citizens, Israel had its existing privacy laws put to the test
relative to its chosen COVID-19 contact tracing method and in large part
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failed per Israel's Supreme Court ruling in Meir.1 30 If the United States chose
to surveil its citizens for contact tracing purposes in the same type of covert
manner as Israel did, and did not require its citizens to provide consent by
choosing to participate in the tracing at their option, then based on Carpenter
and regardless of the type of technology platform being used, such type of
contact tracing would most likely be deemed an unconstitutional search
under the Fourth Amendment.131
IV.

COMPARISON OF APPROACHES TO CONTACT TRACING

In the United States, Apple and Google have developed a digital contact
tracing application with a network that relies on Bluetooth technology to
detect other devices in the vicinity and alert users if they have been in contact
with COVID-19 Cases.132 Apple and Google represent that their system will
not collect personally identifiable information or user location data, and that
Cases who share their COVID-19 diagnosis on the digital application will
not have their identities disclosed to other users. 133 The Apple/Google
Bluetooth platform uses beacons to detect location data and then anonymizes
that data using a decentralized system, which means the data is stored locally
on the users' phone rather than in a centralized database.1 34 Although Google
and Apple have encouraged each country to utilize a single application for
contact tracing, the United States has not taken a national, unified approach
in its response to COVID-19, which includes its decision to use or not use
contact-tracing applications. 135 Some states are using contact tracing
applications that rely on Bluetooth technology, others are using GPS-based
platforms, and most states are not using a contact tracing application at all,
which has raised concerns of confusing the applications' users and also
making contact tracing more difficult as users cross state lines.1 36 As of late
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summer 2020, only North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Rhode Island,
and Utah are utilizing contact tracing applications.1 3 7 In Utah, after a few
months of releasing the application, Utah announced it was inactivating the
location tracking feature in the application due to the public's lack of
comfort-level with the tracking aspect and would utilize the application going
forward as a COVID-19 information hub for its users.' 8 Thus far, the only
state appearing to have success with its application is Rhode Island, where
its "Crush COVID RI" has been downloaded 60,000 times and the state was
the first in the United States to test twenty percent of its population.1 3 9
Like the United States, the EU had difficulties in achieving a unified
approach with a single choice of a digital contact-tracing application for its
Member States. 4 0 As a result, some individual member countries proceeded
with their own digital applications.' 4 ' For example, Switzerland chose an
application called "SwissCovid" which utilizes the Apple/Google
platform. 4 2 Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal published a joint
statement expressing frustration that the Apple/Google application platform
restricts the government's ability to extract virus data and patient locations,
yet many countries chose a version of the Apple/Google solution because
they simply could not find another viable digital solution. 143 Germany
ultimately decided it would utilize the Apple/Google application, favoring its
decentralization of data only being stored on devices." The outliers are
France and the U.K.45 France is using "StopCovid," developed by French
companies utilizing Bluetooth that is always activated. 146 As a result, a
significant efficiency challenge for the EU in contact tracing application
effectiveness will be the ability, or lack thereof, for these different
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applications to interface and share data by interoperating effectively in a
region of multiple countries.14 7
In Israel, per its Supreme Court ruling in Meir, legislation from the
Knesset will be required in order for the government's contact tracing
program involving the Shin Bet to continue.148 What is notable overall is that
when considering opt-in contact tracing applications, researchers are not
certain as to the percentage of users that would be required to result in the
efficacy of these applications. 149 Some researchers estimate that eighty
percent of a population's participation would be required to be effective,
while other researchers have stated that even a ten percent participation rate
could slow the rate of COVID-19 infections.150
V.

CONCLUSION

As Israel's Supreme Court stated in Meir, "these are days of national
and worldwide crisis of dimensions and scope the likes of which we have not
known."151
As U.S. citizens are encouraged to get tested for COVID-19, even
waivers of privacy rights regarding sample collections at COVID-19 testing
locations open to the public and subsequent test processing can be a cause
for concern. For example, consider the following language from the Florida
COVID-19 Test Consent and Authorization online document presented to me
when I attempted to sign up for a testing service recommended on Twitter by
the Florida Division of Emergency Management:1 5 2
II. HIPAA Authorization

I hereby consent to and authorize (i) the disclosure of my
completed Test to the Labs [defined as "one or more independent
clinical laboratories"] in order to permit the Labs to analyze and
interpret my Test, and (ii) the disclosure of my Test results in any
manner permitted by federal or state privacy and security laws.
This consent and authorization is valid as of the day this document
is signed by me and expires after one (1) year.
In addition,

I understand and acknowledge the following:
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1. I understand that I have the right to revoke this consent and
authorization at any time that I so choose by notifying eTrueNorth.
If I revoke this consent and authorization, I understand that the
revocation would only apply after I notify eTrueNorth.
2. I understand that my consent and authorization will result in the
use or disclosure of my protected health information. Though
precautions will be taken to protect the confidentiality of this
protected health information, I understand that the transmission of
protected health information presents risks and that the
confidentiality of such information may be compromised by
failures of security safeguards or illegal tampering.
3. 1 understand that I may receive a copy of this consent and
authorization by accessing "DolNeedaCovid19test.com" or by

calling (800) 635-8611.151
This consent and authorization to transmit protected health information
to a testing agency, recommended by the state government with the
knowledge that such health information may be compromised due to
"failures of security safeguards or illegal tampering" may be realistic, but it
does not bode well for the encouragement of the publics' trust.'5 4 Arguably,
a person presented with such a waiver of rights requirement before obtaining
a test, that such person felt was necessary to protect his or her health as well
as family members from virus transmission, may be averse to trusting a
contact tracing application to have adequate data protection safeguards. "The
core associated concern for Coronavirus apps generally, and interoperability
specifically, is that users need to be able to trust apps to use them."'"5 Florida
is one of the many states that have elected not to utilize an application.1 56 As
reported in the New York Times, the Florida Department of Health has hired
1600 college students, along with epidemiologists and other staff, to conduct
contact tracing manually, which is roughly a third of the amount of contact
tracers recommended per capita by the National Association of County and
City Health Officials. 157 One of the college students hired by the state to
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conduct contact tracing, Dalton Price, initially only had a few to several
COVID-19 Cases to contact each day, but now he and his fellow contact tracers
have over a hundred Cases to contact, resulting in significantly shorter
interviews with each Case due to lack of resources.1 58 Mr. Price has indicated
that it is so overwhelming that the Florida tracers are expediting each Case
investigation now, such that if a person does not have severe symptoms, the
tracers will tell the Case to inform their own contacts that they should selfquarantine and will only get a "general idea" of where the Case has been
without monitoring all of their contacts.1 59 As COVID-19 Cases in Florida
continue to spike, a contact tracing application could potentially increase
efficiency in such a situation.
Ideally, contact tracing would be a global, interoperable technology
approach when travel restrictions are relaxed, but at the very least each
system of government should be sharing data in real time to identify and
quickly contain outbreaks when they occur. As FTC Commissioner Wilson
noted:
[a] recent Washington Post/University of Maryland poll found that
60% of Americans are not willing or able to use the contact-tracing
app that Apple and Google are developing. If public health
authorities are going to rely on these apps, then researchers,
60
companies, and governments need to bridge the trust gap.1

We need preemptive federal legislation if we expect the public trust to
reach a level wherein usage of the application will be significant enough to
be effective, especially in a time when personal liberty to Americans is so
paramount that they refuse to wear masks. It should be comprehensive
legislation to resolve current ambiguities in the gaps left in HIPAA and FTC
regulations as it pertains to phone applications gathering personal
information, but part of its safeguards should also be that the data is purged
after a reasonable period of time. The collection of data should be
proportional to what is necessary for the intended purpose; that is,
understanding that "for a short time, health and safety issues may take
precedence over some privacy protections" but privacy concerns cannot be
ignored, as "privacy and data security missteps can cause irrevocable
harm."'61
However, this may ultimately be a moot point. According to Dr. Peter
Hotez, Dean of Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine, "the cases
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are rising so rapidly (across the South and Southwest in the United States),
that we cannot even do contact tracing anymore. I don't see how it's possible
to even do that."1 62 As noted above, the United States has incurred
8,081,489 COVID-19 Cases resulting in 218,511 deaths. 163 And as Dr.
Aileen M. Marty, an infectious disease professor at Florida International
University, told the New York Times, "[c]ontact tracing and testing is a tool
for action, and that's not the way we've been using it in the United States,
for the most part .. .When you do it right, testing and contact tracing can
eliminate the virus from the community."6"4
"We failed to act." 165
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